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Former Bush insider Lawrence Wilkerson blasts
Dick Cheney's "paranoia"
Mark Follman
(Feb 27, 2006) writing for Salon
There's been no shortage of former
high-level insiders going public with fierce criticisms of the Bush
administration. But since first speaking out last fall, Lawrence
Wilkerson, a retired Army colonel who served as former Secretary of
State Colin Powell's chief of staff, has proved the fiercest. In a
watershed speech at the New America Foundation in October, Wilkerson
delivered a blistering indictment, charging that on vital
national-security matters, the White House was run by an
anti-democratic "cabal" led by Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.
Wilkerson has also suggested that he
and his boss at the State Department were duped by the case for war
forged inside the Pentagon and CIA under the close watch of Cheney and
his top aides. He and Powell were kept in the dark about doubts over
Iraq's WMD capabilities, even as they worked to vet the intelligence
before Powell's landmark pro-war presentation to the U.N. Security
Council in February 2003. It turned out to be built on a stockpile of
fictions.
But Wilkerson said bogus intelligence
isn't his principal reason for coming forward -- it's the use of
American forces to torture prisoners in the war that it launched. In
mid-February, against a backdrop of new revelations about torture at
Abu Ghraib and a call by U.N. investigators to shut down the U.S.
prison at Guantánamo Bay, Wilkerson sat down for an interview
with Salon, following a panel on national security at the University of
Maryland. Last fall, he had spoken of a "visible audit trail" on
torture leading from the soldiers in the field all the way up to
Rumsfeld and Cheney.
Wilkerson said that by the time of the
Abu Ghraib revelations in spring 2004, he began to realize how “deeply
contaminated” the military had become due to post-9/11 interrogation
policies. A military man of 31 years, he knew that the widespread
abuses could have taken place only if sanctioned from high up in the
civilian and military leadership.
Powell, who had served as the
nation's top general under the first President Bush, apparently knew
so, too. “When the word was out that the Abu Ghraib photographs were
about to break, the secretary of state walked through my door and said,
‘Larry, I need you to get together with Will Taft [Powell’s lawyer] and
build me an audit trail. I need all the paperwork -- I need a
description of how we got to where we are.’”
Over the next several months,
Wilkerson developed a dossier of both internal and public materials
that pointed to the vice president’s office. “I saw a chain of
information and orders going out to the field that were codified in
memoranda,” Wilkerson said. “Reading between the lines -- and sometimes
even reading the lines -- they essentially said, ‘This is a new war.
These people are different. Geneva doesn't apply, and we need
intelligence. So smack these guys, stack ’em up. Use whatever means you
need.’” The materials he gathered and the many communications he had
with people in the field formed a clear picture. “What got implemented
in the field,” he said, “was the position Cheney and Rumsfeld argued
for all along: gloves off.”
In response to the initial wave of Abu Ghraib revelations, Rumsfeld
said in a congressional hearing on May 7, 2004: “Mr. Chairman, I know
you join me today in saying to the world: Judge us by our actions.
Watch how Americans, watch how a democracy deals with wrongdoing and
scandal and the pain of acknowledging and correcting our own mistakes
and weaknesses.”
While
a handful of enlisted soldiers have since been convicted of crimes, no
high-level U.S. officials have been brought to justice for wrongdoing.
International law as well as the U.S. military's doctrine of command
responsibility holds that officials -- military or civilian -- who
condone or allow subordinates to commit torture can also be held
criminally liable. But the military has thwarted investigation “every
step of the way,” Wilkerson said. “I got little help from the
services,” he said of his work on the torture dossier. “Vice Admiral
[Albert] Church [who led one of the military’s own investigations into
torture] more or less stonewalled me. Others stonewalled me. There’s
been an awful lot of cover up.”
According to Wilkerson, one of several memos signed by Rumsfeld
approved dozens of interrogation techniques, which were posted in Abu
Ghraib. One item on the list sanctioned the use of military dogs. “When
you tell an E-4 [an Army corporal] or E-6 [staff sergeant] they can use
a dog as long as it’s muzzled -- and you also put heavy pressure on
them to get intelligence -- it’s clear what happens next. Once that
muzzled dog fails in that interrogation session, the next thing they're
going to do is take the muzzle off.”
More
abominable, Wilkerson said, is that these conditions weren’t set just
for suspected al-Qaida or Taliban members, but for any of the tens of
thousands of prisoners taken in Iraq whom Bush had declared entitled to
Geneva protections. The military has acknowledged that the vast
majority of prisoners in Iraq -- as well as the majority of those in
Guantánamo -- have been of little or no intelligence value.
Wilkerson,
60, exited the Bush government along with his former boss in January
2005; he now teaches at George Washington University and the College of
William and Mary. He speaks in direct and sometimes folksy language,
his accent evocative of small-town South Carolina, where he grew up.
The son of a World War II veteran, Wilkerson decided in 1966 to drop
his English lit studies at Bucknell University and to serve in Vietnam.
The Army career to which he dedicated half his life began with service
as a helicopter pilot scouting for the infantry, which took him
repeatedly into heavy combat.
After
the war, Wilkerson attended the elite Airborne and Ranger schools,
completed his B.A. and earned advanced degrees in international
relations and national-security studies. He attended and taught at the
Naval War College in Newport, R.I., and went on to serve as acting
director of the Marine Corps War College at Quantico, Va. Wilkerson met
Powell in 1989, beginning his 16 years on Powell’s staff as an aide and
speechwriter, rising to become Powell’s top deputy during George W.
Bush’s first term.
Naturally,
Wilkerson has drawn fierce counterattacks for his criticisms, notably
from the president’s loyal lieutenants. As Powell’s point man for
preparing the case for a war on Iraq, he received top-level
intelligence briefings. Nevertheless, in November, Rumsfeld called
Wilkerson’s charges “ridiculous,” telling CNN, “In terms of having
firsthand information, I just can’t imagine that he does.” Gen. Peter
Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that he had no
recollection of Wilkerson’s attending meetings with military
commanders, the National Security Council or the president. “I have
never seen that colonel,” Pace said.
Wilkerson
responded to a recounting of those comments by noting that Pace had
been his immediate supervisor back at the Marine Corps War College. “We
sat in the chapel together when a dear friend of ours was buried,” he
said. “He came into my seminars. Pete Pace not knowing me? Come on.
That was an embarrassing moment.”
Wilkerson has the ability to listen keenly and hold his opinions
in
reserve. During the panel discussion at the University of Maryland, he
sat back as fellow speaker Frank Gaffney, the tenaciously right-wing
founder of the Center for Security Policy in Washington, responded to
most audience questions by preaching about the apocalyptic horrors
likely to be unleashed on America and the rest of the civilized world
by “Islamo fascism.” Still, by the time Gaffney declared, “Like it or
not, we’re in a war that will last the rest of our lives, and likely
our children’s and grand children’s lives,” Wilkerson rolled his eyes,
and along with a slight, incredulous smile, glanced at his watch.
Wilkerson’s voice rose in anger when he discussed what he saw as the
“hijacking” of policy inside the administration. “Those people are not
conservatives,” the lifelong Republican said of Cheney and his inner
circle. “I'm a conservative. Those people are radicals.”
Accounts
of the manipulation of intelligence by administration hard-liners in
the march to war have continued to emerge in recent months. In 2003,
when Powell presented his case to the United Nations on Saddam
Hussein’s biological weapons, he relied heavily on intelligence gleaned
from an Iraqi defector code-named “Curveball.” But according to an
in-depth report published in the Los Angeles Times in November, top CIA
operations officials, including then chief of clandestine services
James Pavitt, had grave doubts about Curveball long before Powell’s
U.N. speech. They’d determined Curveball was unstable, an opportunist
and a fabricator, and had sounded the alarm about him repeatedly. “My
people were saying, ‘We think he's a stinker,’” Pavitt, who retired
from the agency in August 2004, told the Times. But former CIA director
George Tenet, who had told the president there was a “slam dunk” case
for war, maintained that deep skepticism about Curveball never reached
him.
“Preposterous,” Wilkerson said. “It’s extremely difficult for me
to
believe that James Pavitt’s doubts didn’t get through to Tenet. Pavitt
was one of Tenet’s principal operators in the CIA.”
Today,
Wilkerson continues to see an administration that punishes dissent,
pushes a radical reinterpretation of the Constitution, and exploits
executive power. “Brent Scowcroft said he didn’t recognize Dick Cheney
anymore,” he said. “I don't know Dick Cheney as intimately as Scowcroft
does, but I did see him as secretary of defense and now as vice
president. I can tell you that 9/11 made him a paranoid, to the extent
where I’m not sure his exercise of power carries with it reason.”
“I've
been told by several Republicans that Cheney was the first vice
president ever to come sit down in the middle of a [Senate] caucus and
chide the members on their votes,” Wilkerson added. “This is not going
to the CIA, where he also exercised undue influence -- this is going to
the Congress and using the office of the vice president essentially to
intimidate lawmakers in their discussions.”
Wilkerson
expressed genuine concerns about terrorism. But he said the
administration has played the fear card with lawmakers by suggesting
that if the United States gets hit again, it will be their fault unless
they back such policies as warrant less spying on Americans and the
brutal interrogation of prisoners.
Such
interrogation led Wilkerson to cite Aharon Barak, the chief of the
Israeli Supreme Court, which ruled against the torture of prisoners in
1999. “This is the destiny of a democracy, as not all means are
acceptable to it, and not all practices employed by its enemies are
open before it,” Barak wrote in the decision. “Although a democracy
must often fight with one hand tied behind its back, it nonetheless has
the upper hand.”
Losing that upper hand, Wilkerson said, “is a very dangerous thing.”
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